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The Tenacity of the Intentional Prior to the Genealogy
By Mark Alfano
Abstract
I have argued elsewhere that the psychological aspects of Nietzsche’s later works are best understood from a psychodynamic point of view.  Nietzsche holds a view I dubbed the tenacity of the intentional (T): when an intentional state loses its object, a new object replaces the original; the state does not disappear entirely.  In this essay I amend and clarify (T) to (T``): When an intentional state with a sub-propositional object loses its object, the affective component of the state persists without a corresponding object, and that affect will generally be redeployed in a state with a distinct object.  I then trace the development of the tenacity thesis through Nietzsche’s early and middle works.  Along the way, I discuss a number of related topics, including the scope of the tenacity thesis (does it apply to all intentional states?), the reflexive turn one often finds in Nietzsche’s examples (why does he so often say the new object is oneself?), and the relations among will to power, drives, and the tenacity of the intentional.
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Any tolerably pleasing young woman who had listened and seemed to feel for him would have received the same compliment.  He had an affectionate heart.  He must love somebody.
	~ Jane Austen, Persuasion, chapter 18

I was angry with my friend:
I told my wrath, my wrath did end.
I was angry with my foe:
I told it not, my wrath did grow.
~ William Blake, “A Poison Tree”

1. Introduction, Amendments, and Clarifications
1.1. Tenacity Defined
In Alfano (forthcoming), I argue that the psychological aspects of Nietzsche’s later works (GM, TI, A, and EH) are best understood from a psychodynamic point of view.  In particular, he holds a view I dubbed the tenacity of the intentional:
(T) When an intentional state loses its object, a new object replaces the original; the state does not disappear entirely.
Nietzsche seems to have a hybrid notion of intentional states like awe, sadness, disgust, anger, fear, etc.  On the one hand, they have a biological-affective component; on the other hand, they have a semantic component.  The affective component constitutes the attitude’s type, making it one of awe, sadness, disgust, anger, or fear.  The semantic component gives it a meaning, making it awe of v, sadness over w, disgust with x, anger at y, fear of z.  The affective component of an emotion persists even when the semantic component loses its raison d’être – a mangled remnant of the former intentional state.  This prompts the acquisition of a new semantic object, reconstituting a full intentional state.  Just because someone cannot express his emotion on its original object does not mean the affect associated with it will disappear.  Rather, it remains and perhaps even intensifies, eventually displacing onto a new object.
Nietzsche invokes (T) in all three essays of On the Genealogy of Morals.  In the first, he attempts to explain the priests’ revenge on the warriors by saying that their “hatred grows to monstrous and uncanny proportions” precisely because they are “impotent” (GM I:7)​[1]​; unable to express their hatred directly by attacking the warriors, they redirect their hatred onto language and value systems, undermining the nobles by inverting the “good”/“bad” dichotomy into the “evil”/“good” dichotomy.  In the second essay, Nietzsche argues that the bad conscience is a predictable result of forced socialization.  “All instincts that do not discharge themselves outwardly turn inward […. They turn] against [their] possessors” (GM II:16).​[2]​  The instincts Nietzsche has in mind are aggressive and punitive.  They include attitudes like the desire to harm x, rage at y, and resentment of z.  When the social straitjacket makes the expression of these attitudes towards others impossible, they do not disappear.  Instead, their objects are replaced; they become the desire to harm oneself, rage at oneself, resentment of oneself.  And in the third essay, Nietzsche mulls over a specialization of (T), the idea that “The human will […] will rather will nothingness than not will” (GM III:1), or, as he says at the end of the essay, “Man would rather will nothingness than not will” (GM III:28).  Again, an intentional state (in this case, willing or desiring) does not disappear when its object drops out; instead, it acquires a new object, even if pursuing that object entails self-destruction.
Before proceeding with the primary work of this paper – tracing Nietzsche’s development of the tenacity thesis in Human, All Too Human, Daybreak, The Gay Science, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, and Beyond Good and Evil – a number of clarifications of and amendments to (T) are in order.
1.2. Tenacity Revised
As formulated, it is unclear whether (T) applies to intentional attitudes, which take propositional objects (e.g., believing that, desiring that, fearing that, wondering whether), or intentional properties, which take sub-propositional objects (e.g., believing in, desiring to, fearing something, loving someone).​[3]​  Applying this distinction to Nietzsche scholarship is admittedly anachronistic, but I think it is worth the trouble.  After all, we want to know not just what Nietzsche thought but also what we ourselves might think in light of what Nietzsche thought.  As I demonstrate in section 3, Nietzsche applied (T) almost exclusively to intentional states with (arguably) sub-propositional objects: religiosity, love, hatred, credulity or belief in, obedience, desire to or for, and willing.  The tenacity thesis should therefore be restricted as follows:
(T`) When an intentional state with a sub-propositional object loses its object, a new object replaces the original; the state does not disappear entirely.
For ease of expression, in the balance of this paper I will use the term ‘intentional state’ to refer only to an intentional state with a sub-propositional object.
Next, as formulated, it is unclear whether (T`) entails a two-stage process or a three-stage process, and, if it involves a three-stage process, whether all three stages contain intentional states, or only the first and third.  In the two-stage version of tenacity, an intentional state’s loss of its original object and acquisition of a new object occur simultaneously; there is no gap during which the state is object-less.  In the three-stage version, there is such a gap, prompting the question whether the state in the gap stage is intentional or not.  As section 3 illustrates, Nietzsche believes in the three-stage version of tenacity.  Furthermore, it seems best, both as Nietzsche interpretation and for independent philosophical reasons, to say the second stage does not involve a full intentional state.  As mentioned above, Nietzsche thinks that intentional states can be decomposed into affective and semantic components.  In his discussion of the will (BGE 19), he claims that severing the semantic component from the rest of the state would not leave behind anything recognizable as willing.  In addition, what makes a state intentional is the fact that it has an intentional object (though, as the last century of philosophy has amply demonstrated, that object need not correspond to anything in the actual world).  The second stage involves no intentional object – not even a non-existent one – so it would be absurd to say that this stage involves an intentional state.  Instead, what we should say is that the second stage involves bodily excitations or affects typically (though not necessarily) associated with intentional states.  If this is right, the tenacity thesis may be revised yet again:
(T``) When an intentional state with a sub-propositional object loses its object, the affective component of the state persists without a corresponding object, and that affect will generally be redeployed in a state with a distinct object.
This new version of the tenacity thesis allows for exceptions: a new object need not be acquired every time an original object is lost.  Furthermore, it is consistent with the intuitive difference between a feeling of sadness that takes one object at t1 and another at t2, and two distinct feelings of sadness, one of which is tokened at t1 and the other of which is tokened at t2.  What distinguishes these two cases is whether the affective component of the state at t2 is being redeployed from the state at t1.  If it is, tenacity is involved, but not otherwise.
	1.3. Tenacity Clarified
Even after the revisions made in the previous section, the tenacity thesis may seem philosophically unpalatable.  For one thing, it suggests that intentional states never simply cease to exist but always acquire a new object.  I should not like to be committed to such a strong view, and I doubt Nietzsche was committed to one.  In response, then, I should emphasize that the revised version of the thesis, (T``), allows for exceptions.  In addition, (T``) is consistent with intentional states ceasing to exist in ways other than losing their objects.  In particular, it is consistent with a state ceasing to exist because it loses its affective component.  Nietzsche’s discussion of combating the vehemence of a drive in D 109 mentions exactly this mechanism.  He claims that one way to combat a drive is to starve it of affect, either by devoting all of one’s affect to another drive or by weakening oneself as a whole.  Intentional states can therefore cease to exist even if (T``) is true.
Along the same lines, it might seem that (T``) implies that intentional states only originate through the redirection of affect from antecedent states.  This too is overly strong.  It certainly is the case that some – perhaps many – states come to be in this way, but not all do.  Happily, (T``) is consistent with intentional states’ coming to be in ways other than displacement of affect.  It may be difficult determine in any given case which psychodynamic mechanisms led to an intentional state’s genesis, so tenacity cannot be ruled out in advance, but there is no reason to think that tenacity is inconsistent with other mechanisms.
Next, it might seem that (T``) entails that all intentional states of the same affective type (e.g., all desires, all beliefs, all loves) are identical.  Such an entailment is highly dubious, both as Nietzsche interpretation and as such.  The tenacity thesis is that an intentional state has two components, at least one of which – the semantic one – is not essential.  The details of this non-essentiality claim must be stated clearly.  The idea is that an intentional state S of type T with object O does not necessarily take O as its object.  That S has some object is necessary (otherwise it would not be an intentional state), but that it has O as its object is not.  Compare the following parallel claim: that an elementary physical particle have some position is necessary, but that it have its actual position is not.  Elementary physical particles are individuated by their positions and types (positron, electron, proton, etc.).  Two positrons differ from one another only in their non-essential positions; nevertheless, it is possible to individuate positrons by such properties.  In the same way, intentional states are individuated by their objects and types (belief, desire, perception, etc.).  Two beliefs differ from one another only in their non-essential objects; nevertheless, it is possible to individuate beliefs by such properties.  If this is right, (T``) is consistent with the standard practice of individuating intentional states (in part) by their objects, just as the non-essentiality of position is consistent with the standard practice of individuating physical bodies (in part) by their positions.​[4]​
Finally, if (T``) is correct, it may not be possible fully to overcome religious and metaphysical needs, a contentious claim in Nietzsche scholarship.  I am not convinced of the entailment from (T``) to this impossibility, however, because I think (T``) is consistent with intentional states’ ceasing to exist in ways other than losing their objects.  If this is right, it may indeed be impossible to overcome religious and metaphysical needs simply by denying their objects (much to the chagrin of Christopher Hitchens, Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, and the rest of the new atheists), but it may be possible to overcome these needs in other ways, for example, by starving them of affect.  Moreover, even if it is impossible fully to overcome religious and metaphysical needs, they may be redirected through tactical applications of (T``) to healthier ends.  And in any event, it is not clear to me that Nietzsche thinks it is possible to overcome these needs.  In GS 5:344, for instance, he talks of how “we, too, are still pious,” saying, “that it is still a metaphysical faith upon which our faith in science rests – that even we seekers after knowledge today, we godless anti-metaphysicians still take our fire, too, from the flame lit by a faith that is thousands of years old.”  This argument is not meant to be dispositive, but it does show, at least, that (T``) is plausible as Nietzsche interpretation.
Having dealt with these revisions to and clarifications of the tenacity thesis, I now turn to the main task of the paper: tracing the development of the tenacity thesis in Nietzsche’s works from Human, All Too Human through Beyond Good and Evil.  Along the way, I discuss a number of related topics, including the scope of the tenacity thesis (does it apply to all intentional states, or just a subset of them?), the reflexive turn one often finds in Nietzsche’s examples (why does he think that the new object is usually oneself?), and the relations among Nietzsche’s notions of will to power, drives, and the tenacity of the intentional.
2. First Inklings of the Tenacity of the Intentional
As early as HH, which was published in 1878, Nietzsche had decided that a scientific study of psychology was called for.  In particular, he wanted to be able to formulate psychodynamic laws on the analogy of physical laws.  He begins this book by saying “we need” such laws, calling them “a chemistry of moral, religious, aesthetic ideas and feelings, a chemistry of all those impulses that we ourselves experience in the great and small interactions of culture and society, indeed even in solitude” (HH 1).  Though it may be tempting to read this manifesto as a commitment to physicalism or some other reductive metaphysical research program, I would resist that idea.  Nietzsche does not claim that it is possible or advisable to reduce the social and the psychological to the biological, the chemical, or the physical.  Instead, he argues that we should develop a scientific understanding of the social and the psychological in their own terms.  The metaphor of a “chemistry of moral, religious, aesthetic ideas and feelings” is just that – a metaphor.​[5]​  But it is a metaphor to be taken seriously.   Through it, Nietzsche commits himself to methodological naturalism, though not to a metaphysically stronger form of naturalism.​[6]​
Nevertheless, saying that “we need” psychodynamic laws is a far cry from articulating a psychodynamic theory.  Moreover, though Nietzsche does identify particular cases that can be subsumed under (T``) in HH, his commitment to the principle is neither explicit nor universal.  He seems to think that it only applies to particular types of intentional states, as I discuss in more detail below.
In any event, the section titled “On the suppression of the passions” (GS 1:47) makes it clear that even as late as 1882 he had not yet firmly committed himself to (T``).​[7]​  In this passage, he claims that intentional states can sometimes be successfully suppressed, i.e., that when a passion loses its object, the state itself disappears: “If one continually forbids oneself the expression of the passions […] the result is nevertheless precisely what is not desired:  the suppression of the passions themselves or at least their weakening and alteration.”  Note, however, the epanorthotic caveat tacked onto this claim.  The passions are suppressed – or at least weakened and altered.  If on the one hand they are weakened, the component under attack is the affect, not the object, so (T``) is not at issue.  If on the other hand they are altered, (T``) may in fact be triggered.  Though he does not make more explicit what it would mean to alter a passion, one obvious way is for the passion to find a new object.  In other words, he allows that (T``) may be triggered when one tries to suppress a passion.
3. The Scope of the Tenacity of the Intentional
3.1. Tenacity of Religiosity, Love, and Hatred in Human, All Too Human
As Nietzsche developed the concept of the tenacity of the intentional, he added more and different types of attitudes to the list of tenacious states.  In Human, All Too Human, the only examples of tenacious states are religious emotions, loves, and hatreds.  He claims, for instance, that “religious worship lives on within” a person even after the “assumptions” of religious feelings “are no longer believed” (HH 130).  If awe at x and worship of x are religious feelings that presuppose belief that x exists, then what Nietzsche is saying in this passage is that awe and worship persist even when belief withers.  While this is not yet an instance of the tenacity of the intentional (no new object has been introduced), the next section on “religious after-effects” completes the story.  Here, Nietzsche asserts that, “However much one thinks he has lost the habit of religion, he has not lost it to the degree that he would not enjoy encountering religious feelings and moods without any conceptual content” or with altered content, as from a metaphysical philosophy like Schopenhauer’s (HH 131).  A rational reconstruction of this process involves three stages.  In the first stage, one feels awe of and belief in x, where x in this case stands for God.  In the second stage, one feels awed and credulous “without any conceptual content,” that is, without feeling awe at or belief in anything in particular.  In the third and final stage, the intentional states find a new object, y, where y in this case stands for metaphysical philosophy.
In this early work, Nietzsche had not yet applied his psychodynamic theory to most other types of states.  There is one exception, however, which can be found in HH 566: “Love and hatred are not blind, but are blinded by the fire they themselves carry with them.”  If the statement “love is blind” means that people are inclined to love indiscriminately, that any object at all can fill the void in “I love …” then what this aphorism means is that an intentional state like love (or hatred) is not essentially blind but subject to find a new object indiscriminately, provided it is sufficiently intense.  The process would then follow the same three stages identified for religiosity above: love of x, objectless love, love of y.
3.2. Tenacity of Drives in Daybreak
One relevant passage from Daybreak is D 119, which talks about how, “our daily experiences throw some prey in the way of now this, now that drive, and the drive seizes it eagerly.”  This suggests that drives have, as it were, indeterminate objects.  They “lie in wait,” seizing on whatever chance throws in their way.  Nietzsche goes on to lament that most drives are not “as much in earnest as is hunger, which is not content with dream food; but most of the drives, especially the so-called moral ones, do precisely this.”  Unable to express themselves on real objects, these drives take up imaginary ones instead.  In section 5, I discuss in more detail Nietsche’s notion of drives and its relation to the rest of his moral psychology, especially will to power and the tenacity of the intentional.
3.3. Tenacity of Religiosity, Credulity, and Obedience in The Gay Science
In The Gay Science, Nietzsche reaffirms his view that religious credulity falls within the scope of (T``) and expands that scope to include both credulity more generally and the desire to obey.  In the section titled “Of the origin of religion,” he makes an argument similar to the one in HH 131: “Under the rule of religious ideas, one has become accustomed to the notion of ‘another world (behind, below, above)’ – and when religious ideas are destroyed one is troubled by an uncomfortable emptiness and deprivation.  From this feeling grows once again ‘another world,’ but now merely a metaphysical one that is no longer religious” (GS 3:151).  Here we see the three stages identified above: an original belief in x, followed by an objectless feeling of religious credulity (“an uncomfortable emptiness and deprivation”), followed by belief in y.
Nietzsche suggests that, in addition to religious belief, all belief in is subject to (T``).  In GS 1:2, he criticizes those for whom “the desire for certainty” is their “inmost craving and deepest distress.”  Like those who are habituated to religious belief, someone with a craving for certainty is subject to revise his beliefs in accordance with (T``): if he cannot hold onto his belief in x, his credulity remains and prompts him to find a new object, y, to believe in.
In the fifth book of GS, which was appended to the original four books in the second edition of 1887, Nietzsche expands the scope of (T``) to include the desire to obey.  He argues that both Buddhism and Christianity flourished because the historical context was perfectly suited to them; they “encountered a situation in which the will had become diseased, giving rise to a demand that had become utterly desperate for some ‘thou shalt’” (GS 5:347).  To understand this historical claim, one must first understand Nietzsche’s theory of the will: he divides the soul into a part that commands and a part that obeys.  A diseased will, then, is one in which the commanding faculty fails to play its part.  We can therefore reconstruct his explanation in the following way.  Originally the obedient part of one’s soul desired to obey x, where x is the commanding part of the soul.  The commanding part failed to issue directives, so the obedient part was left object-less.  Ascetic religion then entered the scene, issuing all manner of self-destructive directives, and those directives were taken up by the obedient part.  Thus, by the time of GS book 5, Nietzsche had expanded the scope of the tenacity thesis to include religiosity, credulity, and obedience (an aspect of the will).
3.4. Tenacity of Credulity in Thus Spoke Zarathustra
Thus Spoke Zarathustra is stylistically exceptional in Nietzsche’s corpus.  It stands to reason, then, that it would be philosophically exceptional too.  In this work only one clear example of (T``) is attested.  This example concerns the tenacity of credulity, though it also bears on religiosity, obedience, and the will.  In section 9 of “On Old and New Tablets” (Z 3), we find the following:
There is an old illusion, which is called good and evil.  So far the wheel of this illusion has revolved around soothsayers and stargazers.  Once man believed in soothsayers and stargazers, and therefore believed: “All is destiny:  you ought to, for you must.”
Then man again mistrusted all soothsayers and stargazers, and therefore believed: “All is freedom: you can, for you will.”
When the belief in destiny is abandoned, it is replaced by belief in something else – freedom.  Though this example of (T``) is not as carefully articulated as the others, it shows that Nietzsche did not give up the idea of the tenacity of the intentional when he wrote Zarathustra.
3.5. Tenacity of Love, Hatred, Desire, the Will, and Obedience in Beyond Good and Evil
In BGE 19, Nietzsche characterizes the will in both physiological terms (“a plurality of sensations” and “above all an affect”) and semantic terms (“a ruling thought”).  This conception of the will jibes well with (T``), which also decomposes intentional states into affective and semantic components.​[8]​  The bodily excitations associated with affects comprise chemical and biological modifications that run their course without respect to reason or rationality.  If my heart races when I see a terrifying representation of a dire wolf, merely realizing that the wolf is not real will not automatically and instantaneously restore my equanimity.  Even if the semantic component of the state drops out, the affective one remains.  I thus feel fearful, even though the object of my fear does not exist – indeed, even though I know that the object of my fear does not exist.  Nietzsche thinks that this phenomenon characterizes not just fear but all intentional states.  When the object drops out, the subject feels fearful, guilty, desirous, or credulous (as the case may be) and casts about for something to fear, someone to owe, something to want, something to believe in.  
Three aphorisms from Part Four, “Epigrams and Interludes,” further illustrate Nietzsche’s commitment to (T``) in Beyond Good and Evil.  The first is BGE 76:  “Under peaceful conditions a warlike man sets upon himself.”  In this aphorism, Nietzsche’s jarring assertion can best be understood in the light shed by (T``).  What makes someone warlike is his possession of aggressive drives.  As Katsafanas (forthcoming) puts it, “Part of what it is to be habitually aggressive is to have a recurrent tendency to seek out opportunities for aggression, regardless of whether the circumstances merit aggressive responses.”  This aggressive drive can be resolved, like the will as characterized in BGE 19, into two components: affects and sensations (anger, rage; tingling in the extremities, bounciness in the step) and a semantic object (the enemy).  A warlike man sets upon himself in peaceful conditions because his aggressive drive does not disappear when its intentional object (the enemy) drops out.  Instead, the sensations and affects remain, prompting him to find a new object:  himself.​[9]​
	The second relevant aphorism is BGE 175:  “In the end one loves one’s desire and not what is desired.”  Like BGE 76, this pithy little sentence makes sense as a special case of (T``): one loves one’s own desire (the state) more than what is desired (its intentional object) because one would rather give up the latter than the former.  The sensations and passions that partially constitute desire stick around when the object of desire disappears.  Reginster (2007) also comments on this aphorism.  He interprets it in terms of will to power, arguing that Nietzsche means that people have second-order desires to have first-order desires which are eventually satisfied after some struggle.  According to Reginster (p. 37), these second-order desires do not specify any particular content for the first-order desires they take as objects: they are desires to desire something, but it is not the case that there is something that they are desires to desire.  If this scope distinction is right, then (as I will argue in more detail below) will to power grounds the tenacity of the intentional.  People desire to desire something, so if the thing they currently desire to desire drops out, they will continue to desire to desire something, prompting the acquisition of a new object for their first-order desire.
The third relevant aphorism is BGE 159: “One has to repay good and ill – but why precisely to the one who has done us good or ill?”  Once again, this enigmatic nugget of cynicism is best understood as a special case of (T``): one begins with a desire to repay x with good (ill), but one is unable to express that desire.  The object, x, therefore drops out and is replaced by y, which may be anyone ready-to-hand, including oneself.
Finally, Nietzsche continues in BGE to think that tenacity applies to obedience.  In BGE  199, he says, “[I]t may fairly be assumed that the need for [obedience] is now innate in the average man, as a kind of formal conscience that commands:  ‘thou shalt unconditionally do something, unconditionally not do something else,’ in short, ‘thou shalt’.”  He goes on to say, “This need seeks to satisfy itself and to fill its form with some content.  According to its strength, impatience, and tension, it seizes upon things as a rude appetite, rather indiscriminately, and accepts whatever is shouted into its ears by someone who issues commands” (BGE 199).  In Nietzsche’s notion of a formal conscience, we see again the scope distinction made above: the conscience demands “thou shalt do something,” not “there is something thou shalt do.”  Its object is indeterminate, subject to be filled indiscriminately by “whatever is shouted into its ears.”
	3.6. Summary
The following table summarizes the types of states to which Nietzsche applies (T``) in Human All Too Human, Daybreak, The Gay Science, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, and Beyond Good and Evil.
Table 1: The Expansion of the Scope of (T``) in Nietzsche’s Early Works
	Type of State







It seems clear that by 1886 (the publication date of Beyond Good and Evil), Nietzsche had decided that the tenacity thesis applied to belief in, desire, various emotions, and drives.
4. The Reflexive Turn of the Tenacity of the Intentional
In Alfano (forthcoming), I argue that Nietzsche thinks the selection of a new intentional object when (T``) is triggered is a deterministic process of a particular sort.  He seems to think that no object is ruled out a priori (making the process minimally indeterministic) but that local pressures select the new object (making the process subject to deterministic causal forces).  As mentioned in the previous section, an unsatisfied drive will replace its original content with “whatever is shouted into its ears.”  This prompts the question why Nietzsche so often claims that the new object is oneself.  Why does the warlike man set upon himself in peaceful conditions (BGE 76)?  Why would one express “defiance against oneself” (HH 137)?  Why would someone “gather together his enemies’ spears and bury them in his own breast” (HH 138)?
I believe the answer to these questions is at once simple and profound:  we are always with ourselves.  When all others are out of reach, one can always make oneself the object of an intentional state.  Nietzsche, too, seems to subscribe to this idea.  He says that “some men have such an intense need to exercise their strength and love of power that, lacking other objects or because they have always otherwise failed, it finally occurs to them to tyrannize certain parts of their own being” (HH 137).  The self is the object of last resort.  In the next section of Human, All Too Human, Nietzsche makes the same point.  He argues that when one’s affect “has been brought into a state of extraordinary tension,” one is apt to do anything that would “relieve” the tension, even if it means “the exchange of one idea [viz. the original object] for another [oneself]” (HH 138).  This is not meant to entail that the self may not also be the object of first or second resort.  The United States Federal Reserve is the lender of last resort, but it also lends to banks that could easily acquire loans from other institutions.  Indeed, Nietzsche seems to think that the spiritualization or sublimation of drives is one species of the reflexive turn, and not necessarily a sign of ressentiment or poor psychic health (Richardson 1996, p. 188).
If this is right, we can also explain why the reflexive turn seems to affect conative states but not doxastic states:  conative states can only be expressed through action while doxastic states need not.  One is not driven to the self – the object of last resort – when doxastic states trigger (T``) because selecting a doxastic object does not require action directed towards that object.  By contrast, sometimes the only available object of action is the self, so conative states may be constrained to take the self as their object.
5. Will to Power, Drives, and the Tenacity of the Intentional
5.1. A Tentative Characterization of Will to Power
Starting with the basic explanatory units of will to power and tracing their etiology in accordance with (T``), Nietzsche hopes to explain the emergence and stability of various psychological, moral, and social phenomena.​[10]​  It may sound a grandiose project, but that is his aim.​[11]​  He claims to understand psychology “as morphology and the doctrine of the will to power” (BGE 23), where morphology essentially amounts to the tenacity of the intentional.  I quote at length: “Suppose nothing else were ‘given’ as real except our world of desires and passions, and we could not get down, or up, to any other ‘reality’ besides the reality of our drives – for thinking is merely a relation of these drives to each other” (BGE 36).  As Richardson (1996, p. 21) puts it, “The beings or units in [Nietzsche’s] world are crucially end-directed, and to understand them properly is to grasp how they’re directed or aimed.”  One of the keys to understanding how these units are directed is the scope distinction between a drive aiming at something and there being something that a drive aims at.  Nietzsche consistently frames his theories in the former, narrow-scope way.  Will to power is, as Reginster puts it, a desire to desire something; but it is not the case the there is something that will to power is a desire to desire.
As BGE 36 shows, Nietzsche thinks that all intentional states are affective because they are constructions out of will to power.  One wants to know, then, what exactly “will to power” designates.  The answer to that question is beyond the scope of this paper, but I shall use the following as a rough and ready characterization.  Will to power is the psychodynamic equivalent of the physical notion of momentum.  It has a direction (its intentional object) and a magnitude (its intensity).  Its direction should not, however, be confused with a target.  A hurtling projectile has a direction, and it is bound to strike something, but it is not the case that there is something it is bound to strike.  A gust of wind, an intervention in the area towards which it is headed, an adjustment to its direction will cause it to strike something else.  In the same way, will to power has an object; it is bound to be expressed on something, but it is not the case that there is something on which it is bound to be expressed.​[12]​
5.2. From Will to Power to Drives
Drives connect the notion of will to power with the tenacity of the intentional.  While will to power is an indeterminate second-order desire – a desire to desire something – a drive is a largely indeterminate first-order desire – a desire for something of type T.  Drives are individuated by the types associated with their objects (see Janaway 2007, p. 158).  Thus, for example, the sex drive is a desire for sex (with someone or other), the aggressive drive is a desire to dominate (someone or other), the will to truth is a desire to know (something or other).
As a number of commentators have pointed out, will to power is not undifferentiated desire simply to have power.  Richardson (1996, p. 23), for instance, argues as follows:
To be a will to power, it must already want something other than power.  Thus each drive is a specific way of pursuing power in a project whose overall lines were drawn beforehand.  So Nietzsche thinks of drives as belonging to largely stable types, not able to redirect themselves onto radically different routes toward power; the sex drive doesn’t transform itself into an urge to eat.  Instead, he strikingly thinks, drives change through ‘sublimation’ or ‘spiritualization’ of their distinctive pursuits – by their amendment not their replacement.  Thus the sex drive becomes ‘the love of all mankind’ but remains inherently sexual.
Richardson here identifies several of the key points made above: the indeterminacy of both will to power and drives (“it must already want something” or other), the stability of affective type associated with intentional states, and the variability of the particular object of intentional states.  Though I would argue that Nietzsche thinks drives change their objects not only through spiritualization or sublimation, I broadly concur with Richardson’s view in this passage.
Janaway (2007, p. 148) also notices the crucially indeterminate nature of Nietzsche’s notion of will to power.  He says, “It is in our nature that we tend to act, think, and feel in ways which enhance mastery over something,” then goes on to point out by way of example that the fundamental function of the institution of punishment is to provide “opportunities to take pleasure in being master over someone.”  The exact identity of the something or someone over which one has mastery are in a way beside the point as far as will to power is concerned.  A drive, according to Janaway (p. 214) is a “relatively stable tendency to activate behavior of some kind,” but the object on which that kind of behavior is activated is left unspecified.
Thus, while will to power is highly indeterminate, being a desire to desire something, a drive is partially indeterminate, being a desire to activate behavior of type T on something.  In the next section, I attempt to show how this theory of drives connects will to power with the tenacity of the intentional.
5.3. From Drives to Tenacity
Differentiated will to power is a drive, i.e., a desire or disposition to activate behavior of a particular type, though not with respect to a particular intentional object.  This interpretation of drives is quite popular in the literature.  Richardson (2004, p. 39), for instance, argues that “a Nietzschean drive is a disposition that was selected for a certain result; this result is its individuating goal, which explains its presence and its character.  In most cases, the drive will also be plastic toward this result,” where plasticity is a certain kind of flexibility with respect to means.  A drive is plastic towards it goal in the sense that “if one route is blocked, it shifts to another.  The disposition bifurcates (trifurcates, and so on) but then reconverges: it is a tendency to respond differently in different contexts, in such a way that the same result ensues” (p. 28).  The connection with tenacity should be clear.  A drive disposes one to activate behavior of type T or in pursuit of goal G.  At any particular moment, the instantiation of T or the means to G is some particular object.  If that object drops out, the drive remains, prompting the acquisition of a new intentional object.
As an illustration, consider again the origin of the bad conscience as described in the second essay of the Genealogy.  Janaway’s interpretation of this phenomenon seems right on-the-money.  He argues that will to power is differentiated into drives, one of which is to inflict suffering.  “When the instinctive drives of a socialized human individual are prevented from discharging themselves outwardly, they discharge themselves inwardly, on the individual him/herself” (2007, p. 139).  Distinguishing with Katsafanas (forthcoming) between the aim and the object of a drive, we can say that the aim of a drive is what individuates it from other drives (the T it is a desire for), whereas the object is what individuates different expressions of the same drive (the particular object of type T).​[13]​  A drive’s aim is therefore constant, and as long as the drive remains, it cycles through a succession of objects – venting itself on whatever is ready-to-hand.  As he says, “The drive itself is indifferent to the object; the drive simply seeks expression.  So the aggressive drive will seek to vent itself on whatever object happens to be present.”  It is but one step from here to the tenacity of the intentional: when the aggressive drive seeks expression but is unable to express itself on its original object, it acquires a new one (in this case, the self, since no other object is available).
We may now state the exact connections among will to power, drives, and the tenacity of the intentional.  Will to power is a second-order desire to desire something.  A drive is the object of will to power; it is a first-order desire for something of type T.  Drives are individuated by their respective Ts, which Katsafanas calls aims.  At any given moment, an intentional state associated with the expression of a drive has a particular object.  If, however, that object somehow becomes unavailable, the drive persists, along with the affect originally associated with the intentional state.  This prompts the tokening of another intentional state of the same type with a different object, thereby allowing the expression of the drive and the (partial) satisfaction of will to power.
6. Conclusion
If the foregoing account is correct, Nietzsche held (T``) by the time of Beyond Good and Evil and had developed many of the insights required to formulate it in Human All Too Human, Daybreak, The Gay Science, and Thus Spoke Zarathustra.  This leaves us with two further questions.  
First, is Nietzsche right?  Is (T``) true?  In Alfano (forthcoming), I argue that there was reason to think that contemporary research in the emotions warranted a qualified endorsement of (T``): the more intense the affect associated with a state, the more likely it is to be subject to (T``).  I continue to hold this view and cite with pleasure recent work by Demian Whiting (2006, forthcoming) and Daniel Shargel (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation) in emotion theory.  According to both Whiting and Shargel, emotions only seem to have intentional objects, whereas in fact they are object-less feelings.  Though the tenacity thesis does not go so far as to say that emotions are object-less, it draws aid and comfort from such views.  If it is plausible that emotions have no objects, then it is even more plausible that they do not have their objects essentially.​[14]​  Recent studies in experimental psychology also lend credence to the tenacity theory.  In a number of such experiments (Schnall, Haidt, Clore, & Jordan 2008, Wheatley, & Haidt 2005), participants showed a tendency to transfer the emotion of disgust from one object to another, unrelated one. 
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^1	  I have throughout this essay used the following translations of Nietzsche’s works: Nietzsche, F. 1984.  Human, All-Too-Human.  Trans. Faber & Lehmann.  New York: Bison Books.Nietzsche, F. 1997. Daybreak.  Trans. Hollingdale, Eds. Clark & Leiter.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Nietzsche, Friedrich.  1989.  On the Genealogy of Morals. In On the Genealogy of Morals & Ecce Homo. Ed. & Trans. Kaufmann. New York: Vintage Paperbacks.Nietzsche, Friedrich.  1974.  The Gay Science.  Ed. & Trans. Kaufmann.  New York: Vintage.Nietzsche, Friedrich.  1978.  Thus Spoke Zarathustra.  Trans. Kaufmann.  New York: Penguin.Nietzsche, Friedrich.  1966.  Beyond Good and Evil.  Ed. & Trans. Kaufmann.  New York: Vintage.
^2	  Beals (forthcoming) discusses this passage as well, and interprets it in a way similar to the tenacity thesis.
^3	  Sub-propositional objects are the meanings of variables, constants, functions, predicates, and operators; they combine to make propositional objects.  For instance, ‘Mars’ is a constant denoting Mars, and Mars is a sub-propositional object; ‘is red’ is a predicate denoting the property being red, and being red is a sub-propositional object.  Putting together Mars and being red, we get the proposition that Mars is red.
^4	  See section 5 for more on the individuation of intentional states and of drives.
^5	  The fact that Nietzsche uses a physical science to make this metaphor is interesting but no means a dispositive reason to think he is committed to physicalism.  After all, the physical sciences were the only ones in a state of maturity in Nietzsche’s time (and, arguably, even now).  The one exception is philology, for which Nietzsche also shows great respect.  One might think that HH 16 and 17 counter my contention about the metaphorical nature of the “chemistry of moral, religious, aesthetic ideas and feelings,” but even in these passages Nietzsche talks not only about physical explanation but also about historical explanation. 
^6	  See Acampora (2006), Bittner (2001), Clark (1990), Clark & Dudrick (2004), Gemes & Janway (2005), Hussain (2004), Janaway (2007), Leiter (2002), Richardson (2004), Schacht (1988) for more on Nietzsche’s nuanced commitment to naturalism.
^7	  Daybreak 109 also attests Nietzsche’s unclear commitment to (T``) in his early works.  In this section, he canvasses six methods for  “combating the vehemence of a drive”: (1) avoiding opportunities for its gratification, thereby starving it, (2) strictly regulating its gratification, thereby curbing its influence, (3) giving oneself over to it entirely to generate disgust with it, (4) associating its gratification with pain, (5) putting all one’s energy into something else, thereby starving it, and (6) weakening oneself as a whole.  Note that most of these methods involve attacks on the affective component of the drive, not its semantic component.  The first two may involve the semantic component, though that is unclear.  If they do, this passage shows that Nietzsche had not yet fully worked out the details of his view on tenacity yet.
^8	  See section 5 for more on Nietzsche’s notion of affect and its relation to will to power, drives, and the tenacity of the intentional.
^9	  Compare GM III:11 “[People] inflict as much pain on themselves as they possibly can out of pleasure in inflicting pain.”
^10	  Although the precise expression “will to power” (der Wille zur Macht) is first attested in Nietzsche’s published writings in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, it roots lie in Daybreak and The Gay Science.  For instance, in GS 4:333, Nietzsche claims that understanding is in part a construction out of laughing, lamenting, and cursing, that it is “nothing but a certain behavior of the instincts toward one another.”  Similarly, in GS 5:360, Nietzsche boasts that he was the first to discern the difference between “the cause of acting from the cause of acting in a particular way, in a particular direction, with a particular goal.”  The former (“a quantum of dammed-up energy that is waiting to be used up somehow”) corresponds to affect, while the latter (“a little accident in accordance with which this quantum ‘discharges’ itself in one particular way – a match versus a ton of powder”) corresponds to intentional object (or, as Nietzsche says, “purpose”).
^11	  For Nietzsche, even the seemingly dispassionate state of thought is a construction out of will to power.  The notion that desire and the affects play a role in thinking dates back in Nietzsche’s oeuvre to the section titled “To the realists” in The Gay Science:  “in your unveiled state are not even you still very passionate and dark creatures compared to fish, and still far too similar to an artist in love” (GS 57).  For biological and physiological reasons, (T``) most naturally applies to affective states, and for Nietzsche all intentional states have an affective component.
^12	  See BGE 19 and GM II:13.
^13	  Poellner (2007, p. 237), who makes a similar distinction, calls the object the “particular object.”
^14	  Other emotion theorists have a view halfway between that of Shargel & Whiting and mine.  For instance, Kenny (1963) thinks that neurotic fear is an objectless emotion or quasi-emotion: a state with the affective component typically associated with fear yet without an object.  Lamb (1987) argues for the existence of a whole battery of object-less emotions, which he classes as moods.  And Thalberg believes that depression, anxiety, and euphoria are all object-less emotions.
